At first glance, there are sound justifications for the break-even rule. With it, the UEFA seeks to guarantee clubs long-term financial stability by forcing them to "keep their wage bill under control" by "lowering salary costs and/or limiting the number of players under contract" 5 In other words, the idea is to reduce "player costs" (transfer fees, agents' fees, wages, etc.), which have exploded in recent years. Moreover, the break-even requirement will arguably promote a competitive balance amongst clubs, by making sure they compete "on an equal footing". 6 In short, the idea is to prevent "fake" financial competition from taking precedence over "true" sports competition.
Clearly, Financial Fair Play is in the spirit of times. In recent years, spending discipline -in layman words, "austerity" -has been the mantra of contemporary economic policies across the globe (eg, in fiscal matters, in banking, etc. ambit of law. And there are good grounds to believe that it violates both the spirit and the letter of the European Union ("EU") competition rules. First, because several economic studies report that the break-even rule will distort competition by giving rise to an "ossification" of the market structure. In plain words, the break-even rule cements, freezes, congeals the clubs' existing financial positions. As a result, the "big" clubsthose with currently the highest revenues -are given an unparalleled advantage over the "small" clubs -those with currently the lower revenues -because the latter can no longer use debt to make investments similar to the former. 8 In our example, Real Madrid can hire almost 5 Cristiano Ronaldo for €96 million. But Standard Liege cannot even afford a third of his transfer price. With this, what the FFPR promotes is the emergence of an "oligopoleague" of big wealthy clubs within the UEFA competitions. 9 Those clubs will enjoy a paramount position in the upstream input market for the purchase of players. And this will likely yield a cascade of anticompetitive "side effects" on downstream "secondary" markets (tickets, subscriptions and merchandising bought by supporters, fans and others, sponsoring, TV rights, mobile telephony rights, internet rights, etc.).
Second, because the genuine anticompetitive nature of the break-even rule hits the core centre of the prohibition rule found in Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU"). The UEFA is indeed an "association of undertakings" within the meaning of Article 101. 10 And the break-even rule is an unlawful "limitation of investments" as set out in Article 101 paragraph b) TFEU. Surely, the FFPR does not limit all investments, but only those that yield debt (spending>revenues). That said, Article 101 paragraph d) prohibits any concerted limitation of investments, regardless of its type, magnitude and/or effects. And this is understandable. In real life markets, debt is a conventional strategy to finance productive investments, and a driver of market competition.
Third, because the case-law of the EU Commission and the Court has repeatedly held that a concerted limitation of investments is by its very nature ("by object") unlawful. In Brasseries Kronenbourg and Brasseries Heineken, the Commission sanctioned as a hard-core infringement an agreement whereby two rival breweries had jointly agreed to halt investments in downstream capacities. 11 Similarly, in Irish Beef, the EU Court of Justice held that a "crisis cartel" that sought to reduce overinvestment was a restriction of competition by "object" contrary to Article 101(1) TFUE. 12 Of course, in EU competition law, firms liable for a potential infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU remain free to rebut the allegation, by bringing forward justifications for their conduct. A first possibility is to assert a defence under the exemption clause of Article 101(3) TFEU.
However, in practice, this defence is inapplicable in cases of by "object" restrictions of competition, all the more so for horizontal agreements like the FFPR. 13 Another possibility is to invoke the protection of the Wouters 14 and Meca-Medina judgments. 15 Under this stream of case law, the applicability of Article 101(1) TFEU can be defused if the restriction of competition is "inherent" in the pursuit of the objectives of the regulation, and if it is "proportionate".
However, far from placing clubs on "equal footing" as the stated objective of the FFPR, the break even rule creates an asymmetry amongst football clubs: the rich clubs can make major investments, the poor ones not. This could even be akin to an additional violation of competition law, this time of Article 101(1) TFEU paragraph d), which outlaws decisions of associations of undertakings that create a "competitive disadvantage" in the market.
In addition to failing the "inherency" test, the break-even rule also fails the "proportionality" test. In the economic literature, less restrictive alternatives have been proposed: bank guarantees, "luxury tax" on overspending (eg, 10 cents/€ of overspending), 16 etc. 17 The disproportionality is further aggravated by the proposed prohibition of third party coinvestment. 18 In brief, the UEFA wants to prevent third parties -banks, financial institutions, sponsors, etc. -from co-investing with a club in the purchase of players. According to the UEFA, this supplementary prohibition is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the breakeven rule.
Against this backdrop, it has been reported in the press that a football player's agent is challenging the validity of the FFPR break-even rule before a court in Brussels. 19 In his action, the applicant has requested the Brussels court to send a preliminary reference to the CJEU in Luxemburg, to seek the latter's views on the compatibility of the FFPR with EU competition law. 20 Given the complex and intrinsically pan-European nature of the issue, the CJEU is indeed the best placed judicial expert to handle this matter, and the sole competent court to rule authoritatively on the interpretation of the TFEU. Once again, it is all in Brussels' hands…
